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Abstract
Given that sovereign bond markets may be vulnerable to multiple equilibria and
self-fulfilling prophecies, a debate exists over whether and in what way credit rating
agencies (CRAs) are politically biased and may weaponize sovereign credit ratings.
Recent research by Fuchs and Gehring (2017) suggests that CRAs are not biased in
favor of countries which are geo-politically aligned with their home country. In this
paper, I argue that such a bias exists and that it should manifest empirically once
two features of the global economy are controlled for: hidden debt owed to China and
the global network of central bank swap line arrangements. To provide support for
my argument, I first replicate the results reported by Fuchs and Gehring and then
extend the analysis in several ways to account for these two features that have recently
emerged in global finance to show that an in-group bias is present across major CRAs.
NOTE: Due to COVID-19 library closures, access to rating data is severely restricted and the paper is to
be considered work in progress. The author will complete the analysis and update the paper as soon as the
empirical analysis is possible.
∗This draft was prepared for the CIS WP series at USC on 9/28/2020. Comments are welcome and
should be sent to daehler@usc.edu. The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support by CIS.
1 Introduction
1.1 Biases in sovereign ratings
Sovereign ratings (SRs), often used synonymously with the terms “sovereign credit ratings”
or “sovereign debt ratings,” are assessments of a country’s creditworthiness. The precision
and impartiality of such ratings is crucial as low ratings can have several adverse effects:
Firstly, they can affect the credit costs of states (Afonso et al., 2012). Secondly, they can
set de-facto ceilings for corporate ratings (Durbin and Ng (2005); Borensztein et al. (2013)),
thereby affecting the broad economy of a state. Lastly, they can amplify economic and fiscal
crisis in a pro-cyclical way and set in motion self-fulfilling prophecies (Ferri et al. (1999);
Gärtner et al. (2011)).
Most sovereign ratings are unsolicited. That is, most sovereigns do not pay for the
service of a rating agency to issue a rating. This means that the principal-agent problem
inherent in paid-for corporate ratings is mostly absent in sovereign ratings. Hence, in a
perfect world, competition and reputation concerns should lead CRAs to publish accurate
ratings. However, politicians and scholars alike have criticized CRAs time and time again
for biased opinions, opaque rating methodologies, and poor business integrity. For example,
when Standard & Poor’s downgraded the US in 2011, the Obama administration challenged
the credibility of the decision, stating that the rating firm relied on faulty math and acted in
haste. On the other side of the Atlantic we observe a similar picture: When Moody’s down-
graded its assessment on Portugal’s debt payment capacity, then president of the European
Commission, José Manuel Barroso, criticized the firm for being “speculative” and “biased.”
Additionally, speaking to reporters, Barroso said the EU planned to strengthen regulations
overseeing CRAs and that European legislators would also look into issues of “civil liability”
for incorrect judgments by agencies on the credit-worthiness of sovereign European nations.
Moreover, Barroso indicated that there would be some developments regarding the possi-
bility of CRAs originating in Europe which would reduce Europe’s reliance on the North
1
America-based CRAs.1
In summary, scholars’ and politicians’ criticism of CRAs are grounded in the notion that
there are other factors at play behind sovereign ratings than mere cold, objective facts. My
paper takes up this notion and argues for a “political bias” in SRs where the “political
bias” may be made up of two constituent elements: The first element is the “home bias,”
which I define as the inclination of CRAs to assign favorable ratings to their respective home
countries, where the home country is defined as the country in which the headquarters of
the agency is located. The second element is the “in-group bias,” which I define as the
inclination of CRAs to assign favorable ratings to countries with close political ties and vice
















Figure 1: Types of political biases and their empirical manifestations
As an example of the argued home bias, let’s examine the US-China dyad. In Table 1
we see that Chinese and American CRAs give each other’s sovereign vastly different rat-
ings. While the Chinese agency Dagong gives its home country the highest possible rating
(AAA), American agencies give China ratings that are on average 4 notches lower than
Dagong’s (A+, A+, A1). Similarly, Dagong assigns the US a rating that is just two notches
above junk status (BBB+), whereas American agencies assign top marks (AA+, AAA, Aaa)
1See report by Reuters , https://www.reuters.com/article/eurozone-ratings-barroso-idUSB5E7HL
07O20110706; accessed 12 October 2020.
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and on average exceed Dagong’s rating by 6.67 notches. Note the consistency of ratings
across American agencies, which may indicate that ratings are dominated by a systematic
component rather than randomness, i.e. a bias.
Table 1: Ratings by Chinese and American CRAs for China and the US.
Long-term foreign currency ratings for China, by agency

















Long-term foreign currency ratings for the US, by agency

















As an example of the in-group bias in SRs, let’s look at Table 2. We observe that Amer-
ican agencies across the board have a more optimistic view on Israel than Dagong (average
rating difference of 2.33 notches). Again, note the consistency of ratings for Israel across
US agencies which may indicate that the different assessments between the US and Chinese
agencies may have systematic explanations. We also observe a similar picture when we look
at ratings for Japan: Dagong assigns a negative outlook and a lower rating whereas American
agencies are slightly more optimistic, which is in line with the geopolitical orientation toward
Japan of the US and China. Lastly, we observe that JCR gives its home sovereign the best
possible rating (AAA, 4.67 notches higher than the average of S&P, Fitch, and Dagong). To
sum up, the examples serve as a first cut at showing political biases in sovereign ratings:
CRAs appear particularly gentle when rating their home country. They also appear to favor
strategic and geo-politically aligned sovereigns and portrait geo-political adversaries of their
home country as less credit-worthy.
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Table 2: Third-party rating examples
Long-term foreign currency ratings for Israel, by agency













Long-term foreign currency ratings for Japan, by agency











JCR -5 notches /
worse outlook
1.2 Previous literature
Scholarship on home biases has a long history in the economics and finance literature. Indeed,
there are several papers that argue for the home bias as a perennial feature of international
transactions: McCallum (1995) argues for a home bias in international trade and shows
that for the United States and Canada, inter-province trade is 20 times larger than inter-
national trade, holding other determinants of trade fixed. Wolf (2000) documents the same
phenomenon for OECD countries. French and Poterba (1991) argue for a home bias in in-
ternational finance and show that individuals and institutions in most countries hold only
modest amounts of foreign equity despite the empirical observation that returns on national
equity portfolios suggest substantial benefits from international diversification.2 Tesar and
Werner (1995) corroborate these findings, adding that the high volume of cross-border cap-
ital flows and the high turnover rate on foreign equity investments relative to turnover on
domestic equity markets suggests that variable transactions costs are an unlikely explanation
for this home bias.
Similar to the vast scholarship on home biases in international economics and finance,
the literature on the determinants of corporate, municipal, and sovereign credit ratings is
comprehensive and a detailed discussion of it goes beyond the scope of this paper. Instead,
2Cf. Feldstein and Horioka (1979) for the origin of this idea.
4
I focus on previous studies dealing with the determinants of sovereign ratings in particular,
as well as studies dealing with home biases in ratings more generally.
The idea of using a structural model to establish if predicted and actual ratings converge
is first developed in Cantor et al. (1994). Based on statements of major CRAs, they identify
eight quantitative criteria as the determinants of sovereign ratings: per capita income, GDP
growth, inflation, fiscal balance, external balance, external debt, economic development, and
default history. In their econometric analysis, most of these variables are closely related to
the actual ratings assigned and the predictive ability of the variables combined reached more
than 90% with a residual standard error of about 1.2 rating notches.
Ferri et al. (1999) use this method in a dynamic context to show that SRs can be pro-
cyclical. That is, there are periods during which CRAs are less systematic in their assess-
ments and weigh discretionary data more heavily, thereby having the potential to amplify
economic fluctuations. Afonso (2003) extends the method of Cantor et al. (1994) and uses
linear, logistic, and exponential transformations of the rating scales and other robustness
checks. Of the large number of variables that agencies claim to look at, they find that
six variables appear to be the most relevant to determining a country’s rating: income per
capita, external debt, level of economic development, default history, real growth rate, and
inflation rate. Interestingly, while the incentives for a sovereign to default may differ from
those of other obligors and may be affected by domestic political factors (Tomz and Wright
(2007); Panizza et al. (2009)), Archer et al. (2007) find that regime type and most other
political factors have little effect on ratings. Instead, they confirm that trade, inflation,
growth, and default history strongly affect ratings. However, while their results show that
most political factors are not significant determinants for ratings, their interviews with CRAs
would suggest that political factors are considered when assessing sovereigns. Importantly,
scholarship in this fashion does not look at differences in ratings across agencies. Instead, it
explains ratings only based on characteristics of the “rated” but not of the “rater.”
The first to break with this tradition and to include characteristics of the rater in the
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analysis of rating determinants are Ammer and Packer (2000). They examine differences in
default rates by sector and obligor domicile and provide evidence that CRAs are imperfectly
calibrated across issuer sectors. They do not find significant differences in default rates be-
tween US and foreign firms even though foreign firms are rated significantly lower. Similarly,
Shin and Moore (2003) compare ratings assigned to Japanese corporates by two US CRAs
and two Japanese CRAs and find that US agencies assign systematically lower ratings than
the Japanese agencies.
Transferring the idea of Shin and Moore (2003) over to sovereign ratings, Fuchs and
Gehring (2017) are the first to systematically examine the role of rating agencies’ home
country on rating outcomes. They do so by first discussing what they call the “demand” and
“supply” channels that could influence ratings. Then they empirically examine ratings and
find that CRAs assign relatively higher ratings to 1) their home country, 2) culturally more
similar countries, and 3) countries to which home-country banks have larger risk exposure but
not to countries to which the home country has geopolitical ties. To ascertain why culture
matters, they explore in greater detail whether information asymmetries or differences in
risk perception contribute to cultural proximity’s effect and find that cultural proximity is
associated with a more optimistic perception of risk rather than information asymmetries.
To asses whether geopolitical ties influence ratings, they use two measures. First, they use
bilateral voting alignment in the United Nations General Assembly as a proxy for geopolitical
alignment between the home country of the rating agency and the rated country. Second,
they employ a country’s share of total US military aid and take it as a proxy for the strategic
importance that the United States assigns to these countries.
Given that even small biases can have major implications for financing costs of sovereigns
(Rigobon (2002); Jaramillo and Tejada (2011)), verifying the robustness of the missing geo-
political effects on ratings reported by Fuchs and Gehring (2017) is crucial to gain a more
comprehensive view of the international political economy of credit ratings and government
capacity. Indeed, from the examples in Tables 1 & 2 it appears that conclusions that disagree
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with Fuchs and Gehring may be drawn if the analytical lens is widened. Specifically, I
hypothesize that there are two features of the global economy that have recently emerged and
that are crucial to include in the analysis of sovereign ratings, but that previous scholarship
has not addressed. One feature is the “hidden debt” to China and the other is central bank
(CB) swap lines (SLs). Let’s discuss each in turn.
In a recent paper on the long coincident behavior of international capital flows, com-
modity prices, and interest rates in global financial centers, Reinhart (2019) discovers the
curious case of the missing defaults. That is, in spite of the drying up of global capital flows
and a sharp fall in commodity prices from 2012 to 2016, sovereign defaults particularly in
emerging market (EM) economies in this period did not spike higher as the record of the
prior two hundred years would predict. Reinhart argues that China may be responsible for
these missing defaults in two important respects. For one, the larger global footprint of the
Chinese economy, which is growing steadily at a rapid rate, stabilized global trade and hence
the revenue streams of many sovereigns. For another, Chinese ambition to become a global
power led to large official flows to a variety of countries.3 In fact, recent work by Horn et al.
(2019) provides a comprehensive new data set that shows that China has extended many
more official loans mostly to developing countries than previously known. This systematic
under-reporting of Chinese loans has created a “hidden debt” situation, meaning that inter-
national institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, and scholars alike have until recently
had an incomplete picture of how much countries around the world owe to China and under
which terms and conditions. However, now that this data are available, controlling for hidden
debt as part of the debt/GDP ratio is important if we want to establish potential biases of
sovereign ratings: If developing countries under-report the Chinese loans they receive, these
debts remain hidden and thus private information. As such, CRAs may not be aware of
these debts. If so, CRAs themselves have an inaccurate picture of the level of debt of states.
3Over the past two decades, China has become a major global lender, with outstanding claims now ex-
ceeding more than 5% of global GDP. Almost all of this lending is official. That is, it is coming from the gov-
ernment and state-controlled entities. See report by Harvard Business Review, https://hbr.org/2020/02/how-
much-money-does-the-world-owe-china; accessed 10 October 2020.
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However, since CRAs can talk to governments when forming their ratings and especially
developing countries have an incentive to disclose higher debt ratios as a signal of credibility
to be able to attract funds, I surmise that CRAs were aware of this debt and I hypothesize
that CRAs still rate their in-group and home country higher than out-group sovereigns even
if both in-group and out-group sovereigns have similar levels of hidden debt. In other words,
the emergence of China as a lender may fundamentally have changed government’s access
to credit that is not reflected in the credit-worthiness indicated by ratings.
Similar to the emergence of China as a global lender, swap lines have gained momentum
in recent years.4 This is mainly due to the turbulence’s emanating from the 2007/2008 Great
Financial Crisis (GFC) and the Euro Crisis (EC), which lead the US Federal Reserve (FED)
to offer SLs in order to keep global financial markets working smoothly (cf. Obstfeld et al.
(2009); Aizenman and Pasricha (2010); Chey (2013); Baker (2013)). Recently, however,
China has also begun to offer swap arrangements to a relatively large number of countries.5
As swap lines allow governments to obtain foreign currency liquidity which they can use to
honor debts, controlling for them when analyzing the determinants of sovereign ratings is
crucial. Presumably, swap lines given out by a country (for example China) have a much
more pronounced effect on the credit rating of a recipient country by the home agency when
compared to a foreign agency as it is an indicator of trust of the home country in a foreign
borrower. I expect this to be the case as I hypothesize that a swap lines leads to increased
bilateral trust independent of any other underlying geo-political ties.
For all the increased attention scholars and policy makers have paid to CRAs since the
GFC and in particular to political biases, systematic research on the role of hidden debt
4A central bank swap line is an arrangement or facility that allows central banks to activate a central
bank liquidity swap. A central bank liquidity swap is a type of currency swap used by a country’s central
bank to provide liquidity of its currency to another country’s central bank. In a liquidity swap, the lending
central bank uses its currency to buy the currency of another borrowing central bank at the market exchange
rate, and agrees to sell the borrower’s currency back at a rate that reflects the interest accrued on the loan.
The borrower’s currency serves as collateral. In summary, having a swap line facility is for the recipient
bank like having a credit card whereas activating the facility is like actually using the credit card.
5According to McDowell (2019), the People’s Bank of China has signed bilateral swap agreements (BSAs)
with 35 foreign central banks since 2008. Collectively, these deals amount to nearly US$ 500 billion in Chinese
renminbi (RMB) available to Beijing’s foreign partners.
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and swap lines on sovereign ratings is still lacking, as is the verification of the results by
Fuchs and Gehring (2017). My research fills this gap in the literature. By controlling for
hidden debt and swap lines, I may also uncover geo-political connections that are not visible
in commonly used data on alliances. This in turn may render geo-political effects exogenous
and traceable through regression analysis. In doing so, my work contributes to three areas
in the literature. Primarily, I add to the knowledge of sovereign rating determinants and
political biases in sovereign ratings. Additionally, I add to the young and quickly growing
literature on China’s role in international finance (cf. Reinhart (2019)) as well as to the
literature on familiarity and cultural biases in economic decision-making (cf. Huberman
(2001); Guiso et al. (2006)).
1.3 Outlook
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of CRAs and
discusses how they operate, who stands behind them, and what their claimed rating method-
ology is. Section 3 discusses why the home country could matter and lead to political biases
in sovereign ratings. It also looks at alternative/complementary explanations for political
biases to mitigate endogeneitiy issues. Section 4 shows how the theoretical arguments are
operationalized and discusses the data. Section 5 presents the planned econometric specifi-
cations and robustness checks.
2 The actors: global credit rating agencies
Before arguing for and testing a political bias of CRAs, we need to know what CRAs are,
who stands behind or owns them, and how they claim to form their ratings. I address these
points in turn.
CRAs can operate in three areas of business by assessing 1) the creditworthiness of
businesses/corporations, 2) the riskiness of financial products, and 3) the creditworthiness of
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sovereigns. While the first business area has a century-old tradition, the other two activities
are relatively new for CRAs. However, the end result is the same in each of these areas; a
rating picked from an alphanumeric or alphabetic scale, which are similar across agencies.6
The ratings are supposed to give private and institutional investors an idea of the default
probability of a certain issuer relative to others. Crucially, ”[c]redit ratings express risk in
relative rank order, which is to say they are ordinal measures of credit risk and are not
predictive of a specific frequency of default or loss.”7 Naturally, each of these areas need
their own kind of expertise and rating methodology. This is because judging the business
prospects of commercial companies or the solvency of sovereign nations is different from
assessing the riskiness of highly complex contingent financial derivatives.
Of the 150+ CRAs worldwide, the vast majority are relatively small players and only fill
a market niche by specializing on rating local businesses which bigger players don’t cover
(cf. White (2010)). Some of the bigger players go beyond corporate issuers and cover a
limited number of sovereigns, but many of these agencies are not well-known. Only the nine
biggest players are global both in terms of coverage and in terms of prominence. They are
Capital Intelligence, Dagong Global, Dominion Bond Rating Services, Scope Ratings, Fitch
Ratings, Japan Credit Rating Agency, Moody’s Investors Service, Rating and Investment
Information, Inc., and Standard & Poor’s. Importantly, the ratings of these agencies are
available through the Bloomberg and Eikon Refinitiv data portals and feed the analysis tools
of almost all major banks, mutual funds, wealth managers, and investment professionals.8
Therefore, one can expect these ratings to affect investors’ views and global financial flows.
As Table 3 summarizes, the oldest agency is S&P, which dates back to 1860 and has been
issuing SRs since 1922. Fitch and Moody’s are a little younger, but they have been issuing
SRs since around the time of World War I. These three American companies represent the
6See Table 5 in the appendix for a comparison of rating scales.
7I used this definition from Fitch Ratings (2018, p. 3). However, the definition of a sovereign credit
rating of Fitch is congruent with the definitions of other CRAs, including the ones of Standard & Poor’s and
Moody’s Investor Service.
8The rating data of all agencies for my analysis is from Eikon Refinitiv except for CI and Scope ratings,
which are received from the agencies directly.
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so-called “big three” as each of them has several thousand employees and offices in more than
20 countries around the world. Together they posses a dominating position in the market
for ratings. In fact, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) calculates the
combined EU rating market share of S&P, Moody’s and Fitch as 92.1%. The remaining
7.9% of the EU market goes to the other 23 CRAs that are registered in the EU.9 Similar
shares are reported for the US and indeed the global rating market, making these markets
oligopolies. Though the other six agencies covered in this paper are considerably younger
and smaller, interest in these companies is rising, not least because of the growing footprint
of EM investors in global finance.
Table 3: Overview of covered CRAs
Agency Short name HQ location Founded SRs since Registered in Country offices Staff size
Capital Intelligence CI Limassol, Cyprus 1982 2002 EU 3 <20
Dagong Global Credit Rating Co. Dagong Beijing, China 1994 2010 EU, China 3 400
Domninion Bond Rating Services DBRS Toronto, Canada 1976 1998 EU, USA 5 700
Scope Ratings Scope Berlin, Germany 1987 1999 EU 5 200
Fitch Ratings Fitch New York City, USA; London, UK 1913 1994 EU, Japan, USA 31 2000
Japan Credit Rating Agency JCR Tokyo, Japan 1985 1998 EU, Japan, USA 1 90
Moody’s Investors Service Moody’s New York City, USA 1909 1918 EU, Japan, USA 25 12000
Rating and Investment Information, Inc. R&I Tokyo, Japan 1998 1998 Japan 2 169
Standard & Poor’s S&P New York City, USA 1860 1922 EU, Japan, USA 35 22500
Note: All data is the latest available and it is taken from internet research, the companies’ websites, or annual reports.
CRAs are private companies. This may lead to concerns about the independence of
ratings from interests of owners. As I define “home” as the location of an agency’s head-
quarters, it is therefore crucial to identify if the owners are located in the same country as
the headquarters of the agencies. For the most part, this is the case as Table 4 summarizes.
For the analysis in this paper, I use the location of headquarters as the home country.
The rating procedure across agencies appears very similar and generally consists of four
steps; see Figure 2 for a schematic overview.10 The first step of the rating procedure is the
rating initiation in which a sovereign solicits a rating or the agency decides to rate a sovereign
on its own because it sees a need for it. A team of analysts is assigned and data is collected.
The second step consists of due diligence checks: questions are sent to the sovereign and/or
9See report by ESMA, https://www.esma.europa.eu/press-news/esma-news/esma-publishes-2019-cra-
market-share-calculation-in-eu; accessed 12 October 2020.
10I compare the documents on the sovereign rating methodology across the nine agencies and they are
largely overlapping both in terms of style and substance. For this paper, I specifically refer to the well-
documented rating procedure of the largest agency, S&P, accessed 12 October 2020.
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Table 4: Home countries of CRAs










Note: All information is from the companies’ websites, annual reports, or documents for shareholder communication. For
a detailed overview of the ownership structure and ownership history of the agencies, see Table 6.
meetings with the sovereign are held, additional data is obtained, and all information is
analyzed. In the third step, a rating proposal and report is drafted. The rating committee
first discusses this proposal internally and then notifies the issuer on the rating decision. In
the fourth step, the report is finalized and the rating is published. After publication, there
is ongoing surveillance of the sovereign to assure that ratings are current. Hence, the four
steps are less of a clearly defined sequence of events in time and more of a representation of
the parts of an ongoing and recurring cycle. As we see by their prominence in the the first
and second step of the rating process, the qualitative and quantitative factors CRAs use in
their analysis is crucial. The good news is that they are no mystery: We can look directly
at what CRAs claim to be their rating methodology and then employ established methods
from empirical economic research to retrace what appear to drive actual ratings and to see if
the argued biases exist. The key credit factors that they examine can broadly be categorized
into economic factors and political factors. The economic factors have four dimensions;
there’s 1) an assessment of income levels, growth prospects, and other economic variables,
2) an assessment of external factors such as the status of the currency, external liquidity
and the capacity to generate foreign exchange necessary to meet external obligations, 3) an
assessment of fiscal space and 4) a monetary assessment looking at the exchange rate regime
and the credibility of monetary policy as measured by inflation trends etc. The political
factors that CRAs claim to be using cover the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of a
sovereign’s policy-making and political institutions as well as the sovereign’s debt payment
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culture. To sum up, agencies claim to base their rating of a country at a given point in time
only on the economic and political characteristics of the country. This explains why most of
previous scholarship discussed in Section 1 model the rating r of a country i by agency a at
time t as
ra,i,t = f(ei,t, pi,t,) (1)
where e stands for economic factors and p for political factors.11 Note that none of the
regressors are agency-specific, leaving no room for divergent views among agencies such
as those shown in Tables 1 & 2. While all agencies follow similar rating procedures, the
comparison of their size, age, and origin given above suggests a modelling approach such as
the one taken by Fuchs and Gehring (2017): rating r for country i of agency a at time t is
ra,i,t = f(xj,i,t, ei,t, pi,t) (2)
where xj,i,t are country-dyad-specific variables of the home country j and rated sovereign
i at time t. In the next section, I explain the theoretical reasoning behind this modelling
approach.
3 The political biases in sovereign ratings: theory
Why would the home country matter for sovereign ratings? In short, the rating process may
be subject to political influence, private lobbying activities, and CRA employees’ private
interests. These features may cause two types of political biases: the home bias and the
in-group bias. I derive each of these biases in detail, showing how both government-induced
incentives on the hand and market forces on the other hand play a role and how not con-
trolling for hidden debt and swap lines could create endogeneity issues that hide the argued
in-group bias.
11Studies in this spirit are Cantor et al. (1994), Ferri et al. (1999), and Archer et al. (2007). See Table 7
for an overview of the variables used in their econometric work.
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3.1 The home bias
Government-induced incentives
All CRAs derive a large share of their revenues from their home market and are there-
fore closely intertwined with their domestic economies. This opens up several reasons and
channels to lobby for favorable ratings of the home country.
First of all, governments directly have incentives to lobby for higher ratings as low ratings
reduce access to international capital markets. This argument is backed by plenty of evidence:
On the regulatory side, financial market agreements such as the Basel II&III accords force
financial institutions such as banks, which typically are major investors in sovereign bonds,
to respond to the downgrading of a country by adjusting the composition of their portfolio.
Likewise, fund-internal regulations influence how many potential investors there are for a
given country. Specifically, statutes of pension funds, which manage savings on behalf of
private individuals, often forbid investing in assets carrying ratings below a certain level or
they require costly extra capital to be posted (Dale and Thomas, 1991).
Second, since sovereign ratings can set de-facto ceilings for corporate ratings (cf. Durbin
and Ng (2005); Borensztein et al. (2013)), private actors also have incentives to lobby for
a favorable treatment of their home country. In fact, this mechanisms has an additional
iteration: low sovereign ratings may cap corporate ratings, which can lead private actors to
put political pressures on the government. The government, in turn, will put pressure on
the CRA over which it has the most leverage, which is the domestic agency because of its
dependence on revenues in the home market.
Additionally, good ratings add to the status of political leadership, which may cause a
cherry-picking effect: In many jurisdictions only the ratings of officially recognized agencies
can be used by banks etc. to determine their capital requirements (White (2010)). Hence,
governments have some leverage or veto power over agencies’ assessments by not recognizing
agencies with unfavorable assessments, thereby denying them market access. Intuitively,
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this leverage is stronger vis-à-vis the home agency compared to other agencies, because the
home agency has a higher exposure to the home market and losing the license there could
potentially be catastrophic.12
The most logical and direct channel of influence for governments would be through own-
ership. In fact, Shin and Moore (2003) cite a report according to which the composition of
the shareholders of rating agencies may impair the impartiality of ratings. While Table 6
shows that governments aren’t direct shareholders of CRAs, it can easily be imagined that
governments can indirectly exercise voting rights to put pressure on home agencies. This
is because banks and other financial institutions are among the major shareholders of most
rating agencies and particularly the GFC caused governments to become majority owners of
a number of financial institutions.
Private incentives and market forces
Naturally, there are also reasons for a home bias to manifest which are not related to the
government. Not accounting for these reasons could render the results endogenous, which is
why I discuss them here and later control for them in the econometric analysis.
Since higher ratings imply lower refinancing costs for governments, which otherwise would
have to be compensated by higher tax revenues, market forces may contribute to the home
bias in sovereign ratings. Specifically, domestic buyers of corporate ratings, i.e. domestic
companies looking to issue bonds to raise capital, are aware of the connection between lower
ratings and higher taxes and have therefore an incentive to lobby for a favorable rating of
the home country. Again, while they have this incentive vis-à-vis all rating agencies, they
have the most leverage to reach their goal when lobbying at the home agency.
12Anecdotal evidence suggests that governments indeed try to use their influence to impact rating deci-
sions. Some examples: 1) Barroso threatened that the EU would plan to strengthen regulations overseeing
CRAs and that European legislators would also look into issues of “civil liability” for incorrect judgments
when Moody’s downgraded Portugal. 2) Two weeks after Egan-Jones downgraded its home country in 2012,
the US Securities and Exchange Commission brought administrative action against the firm for alleged “ma-
terial misstatements.” 3) S&P claimed that a US$ 5 billion lawsuit brought against it by the US government
was a “retaliation” for removing the US AAA rating in 2011.
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Additionally, Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2011) hypothesize that employees of rating agencies
may have incentives to treat their home sovereign gently because low ratings affect the
banking sector in a negative way. Specifically, they model a “revolving door” that connects
home rating agencies and banks. In their view, analysts can easily transition from rating
agency jobs to banking jobs due to similar professional requirements so that safeguarding
the interests of future employers may enter an analyst’s calculations.
Lastly, shareholders could try to obtain favorable treatment of countries where they are
exposed to large risks, which is typically their home country, cf. French and Poterba (1991).
That is, the home bias inherent in investors’ allocation decisions may in fact induce them to
lobby for a better treatment of their home sovereign as a kind of hedging strategy.
3.2 The in-group bias
Government-induced incentives
Governments do not only have incentives to influence their own ratings but also those of
countries to which they have geo-political ties, leading to an in-group bias in ratings. This
has several reasons.
For example, a better rating of allies with which the home country collaborates in inter-
national fora facilitates burden sharing, such as the financial commitments made through
NATO or similar institutions. Conversely, lower ratings for “enemies” puts an additional fi-
nancial burden on them and weakens their capabilities. This is particularly true for countries
which depend on arms imports: their need for a good foreign-currency rating is particularly
dire as this strengthens their ability to obtain hard currency need for arms imports.
Additionally, home governments have an interest in avoiding a potentially destabilizing
downgrade of aligned countries that are of strategic importance or whose location is of signif-
icance. This mechanisms is corroborated by findings of DiGiuseppe et al. (2012); countries
with ample access to credit have a lower probability of civil conflict and are more stable.
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Private incentives and market forces
Similar to the home bias, there are also reasons for the in-group bias which are not government-
induced and which should be controlled for.
Firstly, private investors of the home agency do not only have incentives to influence the
ratings of the home sovereign but also those of other countries. This is because of spill-over
effects: low ratings for countries to which the home investors have strong ties can have larger
financial outfalls on the domestic economy and debt market.
More importantly still, shareholders of the home agency also have incentives to lobby
for inflated ratings of geo-politically aligned countries. This is because shareholders of the
home agency, particularly banks, do not only have leverage over the rating decisions through
voting rights in the corporation but they also have the incentive to use such voting rights to
make sure that countries in which they have overweight positions be stable and prosperous.
Similar to the “revolving door” notion of the bank-agency relationship, it is plausible that
sovereign rating analysts act favorable toward countries to which home banks have strong
exposures and are vulnerable to risk.
3.3 Confounding factor: culture
The explicit and implicit incentives for governments and private actors outlined above ex-
plain why agencies would assign inflated ratings to their home country and to geo-politically
aligned nations, and the channels (ownership power, lobbying activity, market forces) ex-
amine how such incentives could be harnessed to influence ratings. However, there my be
other reasons for political biases to emerge and accounting for them is crucial if I want to
credibly argue for causality. Therefore, I need to discuss potentially confounding factors and
additional explanations to mitigate endogeneity issues. Note that I am not saying that the
additional explanations are a substitute to the explanations discussed above. Rather, the
politics and economics behind ratings are complex and several variables may account for and
contribute to political biases in sovereign ratings simultaneously.
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Most clearly, the factor that could lead to political biases in sovereign ratings are rooted
in familiarity-related effects. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) argue that such familiarity-
related effects are the norm among humans. They document for Finland that investors are
more likely to hold, buy, and sell the stocks of Finnish firms that are located close to the
investor, that communicate in the investor’s native tongue, and that have chief executives of
the same cultural background. Hence, their empirical analysis shows that cultural proximity
influences the investment analysis and decisions of both private and professional investors.
Furthermore, Giannetti and Yafeh (2012) argue that similar effects exist when it comes to
lending decisions of banks. They show that lenders treat borrowers from culturally more
distant countries as less reliable: culturally more distant borrowers are more likely to be
required to provide a third-party guarantor, face higher interest rates, and receive smaller
loans. In light of this evidence, it would not surprise if culture has effects on sovereign
ratings. In fact, looking at Figure 2, it appears that culture could affect the amount of
collected information in steps 1 and 2. Additionally, it appears that culture could also affect
the interpretation of the collected information in the later steps of the rating process. This
opens up three lines of reasoning how cultural proximity could contribute to political biases:
(maintained) differences in risk perception, preferences and taste-based discrimination in the
spirit of Becker (2010), and actual information asymmetries.
First, in terms of differences in risk perception, Cole and Kehoe (1998) examine why
governments would ever have access to foreign capital, given the difficulty for investors
to enforce claims against a sovereign. They argue that if a country appears trustworthy
in one arena, the country is perceived as trustworthy in others, too. That is, sovereigns
benefit from higher levels of bilateral trust. Since cultural proximity and trust correlate,
it appears plausible that culturally closer countries obtain relatively higher ratings from
analysts. Additionally, there may be a similar explanation that does not necessarily rely
on differences in risk perception that are based on current assessments but on historical
differences in risk perception that were maintained across time. (Samuelson and Zeckhauser,
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1988) argue that most real decisions, for example the assignment of a rating, have a status quo
alternative—that is, doing nothing or maintaining one’s current or previous decision. They
show that series of decision-making experiments confirm that individuals disproportionately
stick with the status quo. There is little reason to expect that the rating process is not
affected by this status quo bias.
Second, culture could play a role in discrimination of races or ethnicities. An example of
this line of reasoning in the market of personal loans is provided in Ravina et al. (2008). The
study examines whether easily observable variables such as the personal characteristics of a
loan applicant and the way he/she presents himself/herself affect lenders’ decisions, once hard
financial information about credit scores, employment history, home-ownership, and other
financial indicators are taken into account. Using data from Prosper.com, an online lending
market in which borrowers post loan requests that include verifiable financial information,
photos, an offered interest rate, and related context, the study finds that borrowers whose
appearance is rated above average are 1.41 percentage points more likely to get a loan
and, given a loan, pay 81 basis points less than an average-looking borrowers with the
same credentials. Similarity between borrowers and lenders has also a powerful impact
on lenders’ decisions. The findings suggest that the mechanism through which personal
characteristics affect loan supply is lenders’ preferences, i.e. taste-based discrimination,
rather than statistical discrimination based on inferences from previous experience. Hence,
it appears possible that culturally closer countries could obtain favorable ratings through
taste-based discrimination among analysts.
Third, it could be that political biases don’t emerge because cultural differences induce
discriminatory practices or different perceptions of risk, but rather because there are infor-
mation asymmetries. Indeed, the findings by Melitz (2008) suggest that linguistic differences
make communication across borders more costly and hinder information transmission, lead-
ing to information asymmetries. Applying this logic to rating decisions, it appears that
agencies from culturally more distant countries posses inferior information about a sovereign
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compared to the home agency. Obviously, this information asymmetry could merely render
ratings less precise, which would only result in bigger error terms when modelling ratings,
but not in the manifestation of political biases. However, inferior information on a sovereign
could not just increase the imprecision of ratings but in fact induce a bias with clear direc-
tion. A theoretical explanation for this can be gained by adopting a similar argument given
by Gehrig (1993): Assume that a rating agency estimates the liquidity L of two sovereigns i
with E[Li] ∼ N(µ, σi
2). Further, assume that a sovereign enters a stage of default if Li < z.
Thus, the probability of default is P (Li < z) = F (
|z−µ|
σi
). Now, assume that two sovereigns
A and B posses identical economic and politic country fundamentals. That is, they have the
same µ, but sovereign B is culturally more distant to the rating agency’s home country. As
a result of higher information transmission costs, the agency collects less information about
the characteristics of distant sovereign B. This has the implication that the prediction of
LB, i.e. the liquidity of the sovereign, is less precisely known compared to that of country
A. Mathematically, this translates into σA
2 < σB







for all z < µ. All this says is that the predicted default probably is seen as higher for the
culturally more distant sovereign which could translate into a lower rating than would be
justified in reality. That is, the home and in-group bias could both result from insufficient
information transmission between countries of dissimilar cultures and/or languages.
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4 Data
In this section, I operationalize the variables discussed in Section 3 and list all controls from
the economic and political spectrum.
Dependent variable
My dependent variable is a country’s long-term foreign-currency rating provided by one of the
nine rating agencies under examination.13 I use the monthly average of the assigned ratings
since the highest frequency for which the explanatory variables are available is monthly.
Importantly, since the rating agencies report their ratings on alphabetical or alphanumerical
scales, I translate them to a numerical scale with 21 notches where a AAA corresponds to
21, AA+ is 20, AA is 19, and so on and so forth; see Table 5.
Regressors
Country-dyad-specific controls
Based on my theoretical discussion in Section 3, I use six variables to test for the existence of
and channels behind political biases in sovereign ratings even though none of these variables
should have explanatory power according to the rating methodology brochures of all nine
CRAs. Specifically, to test for the hypothesized home bias, I use the following variable:
• Home country dummy. The data is hand-coded; the variable takes on the value 1 for
if the home-agency/sovereign pairs and 0 otherwise.14
To test for the hypothesized in-group bias, I use the following variable.
13The nine agencies are CI, Dagong, DBRS, Scope, Fitch, JCR, Moody’s, R&I, and S&P. The data is
from Eikon Refinitiv for all agencies except for Scope and CI whose data I hope to get upon request from
the agencies.
14As stated previously, the home country is defined as the country in which the agency has its headquar-
ters. As a robustness check, I plan to define the home country to be the country where an agency’s majority
of shareholders are located.
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• Bilateral voting alignment in the United Nations General Assembly. The data is from
Voeten (2019). It is a measure for political alignment based on the voting behavior in
the United Nations General Assembly, where countries are politically aligned through
common voting patterns on resolutions. 15
• Swap line dummy. The data is collected directly from central banks. The data is equal
to 1 if the home country offers the rated country a swap line and zero otherwise. I
also plan to interact the dummy with the bilateral voting alignment data to show that
more salient geo-political friendships and rivalries influence ratings.
To account for the alternative mechanisms that could otherwise be mistaken for political
biases as discussed in Section 3, I use the following variables:
• Share of exports of home country to other countries. The data is from UN Comtrade.
While a sovereign’s access to foreign currency should matter for its ability to pay back
debt (which is controlled for by the current account balance), a sovereign’s relative
trade intensity with another government should not matter for ratings.
• Bank exposure to other countries. The data is from the Bank for International Set-
tlements (BIS). The variable ranges between 0 and 100 (%) and captures the share of
home country bank lending to a given foreign country as a share of the total lending
of home country banks.
• Cultural similarity (language). The data is from Kolo (2012). It measures linguistic
differences between the agency’s home country and the rated sovereign based on lan-
guage trees from the Ethnologue project, which classifies 6000+ distinct languages into
families and branches due to their linguistic origin. As such, this variable proxies for
the effect that cultural distance could have on reduced information transmission.
15Measures of UN voting alignment are widely used in the literature to measure bilateral affinity (see for
example Mosler and Potrafke (2020), Dreher and Gassebner (2008), and Barro and Lee (2005)). However, I
am not sure if it is the best measure as it is sensitive to the agenda of resolution topics and may pick up the
“noise of the zeitgeist” rather than actual shifts in foreign policy preferences.
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Country-specific controls
Lastly, I control for those variables that CRAs claim to be using in their assessments. In
doing so, I build on and combine the sets of explanatory variables used in Cantor et al.
(1994), Ferri et al. (1999) and Archer et al. (2007). However, I extend these sets with swap
lines and the hidden debt that countries owe to China.16 Specifically, I use the following
variables to capture a sovereign’s income level and growth prospect:
• GDP growth. Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on con-
stant local currency. The data is from the IMF World Economic Outlook database.
• GDP per capita. GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP) in 2019
international $. The data is from the IMF World Economic Outlook database.
To account for the capacity to generate foreign exchange I use the following variables:
• External balance. Current account balance as a percentage of GDP. The data is from
the IMF World Economic Outlook database.
To account for fiscal space and debt sustainability, I use the following variables:
• Government debt. Total central government debt as a percentage of GDP. The data is
from the IMF World Economic Outlook database.
• Hidden debt to China. Hidden central government debt owed to China as a percentage
of GDP. The data is from Horn et al. (2019).
• Government surplus. The structural budget balance refers to the general government
cyclically adjusted balance adjusted for nonstructural elements beyond the economic
cycle. These include temporary financial sector and asset price movements as well as
one-off, or temporary, revenue or expenditure items such as the sales of mobile phone
licenses. The variable is measured as a percentage of potential GDP. The data is from
the IMF World Economic Outlook database.
16Whenever the data is not monthly, I use end of year values and convert them to monthly series by
taking averages of the two closest values.
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To control for the credibility of monetary policy, I use the following variable:
• Inflation. Annual inflation in percentage as measured by the consumer price index.
The data is from the IMF World Economic Outlook database.
• Currency union dummy. A binary variable equal to 1 if the country is in a currency
union (e.g. Eurozone) and does not have direct control over monetary policy.
In terms of political factors, CRAs claim to be assessing the effectiveness, stability, and pre-
dictability of a sovereign’s policy-making and political institutions as well as the sovereign’s
debt payment culture. I use the following variables to control for such factors:
• Default history. This is a binary indicator variable that notes whether, for a given
country and year, that country has defaulted on its debt in the last five years.17
• Level of democracy (polity 5). The data is from the Center for Systemic Peace and
captures regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary
monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy).
• Election recency dummy. To control for recent changes in a countries leadership, I
create a binary indicator of elections held during the last 12 months.
• Executive ideology. The data is from the World Bank. It is a binary variable for
executive ideology (left or right).
• Rule of law. The data is from the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index.
Data frequency, lagging, and time frame of analysis
For the dependent variable, I use the monthly average of the assigned ratings. All time-
varying controls are lagged monthly averages across the closest two data points. Compared
to yearly data, the usage of monthly data seems preferable as it is more efficient in that it
makes use of all available variation in the data. In terms of the time frame of the analysis,
I use data covering the period between 1990 and 2019.
17Example: If a country defaults in 2008 and never after, the dummy is active for that country in the
years 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012. Thus, for that country in 2012, there was a default in the last five
years but from the perspective of 2013, there was not.
24
Due to COVID-19 library closures, obtaining rating data was not possible so far. As such,
I cannot perform the empirical analysis yet and I have to leave it at stating the identification
strategy and econometric considerations in the next section. As soon as I have the data
available, I will update this paper and show the empirical results.
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5 Empirical analysis
It is clear from the exposition of the data in Section 4 that the present paper does not
enjoy the luxury of an experimental setting and it is hard to imagine how experimental data
could even be generated for it is not possible to “randomly assign” CRAs to countries. As
such, the issue of causality between a CRA’s home country and the argued political biases in
sovereign ratings is a tricky matter indeed, as is the issue of causality in the social sciences in
general. However, I take several steps to come as close as possible to a causal interpretation of
the econometric results. First of all, I control for a large number of conceivable confounding
factors. Not doing so could render political biases as mere artifacts of the data even if they did
not exist in reality. Second, I use all statistical methods and tests at my disposal to generate
robust findings. Of course, statistical methods and tests have well-known limitations. They
never give final proof, one way or another, but only serve as pieces of evidence. Nevertheless,
there is a crucial difference between abstract statistical reasoning and econometrics. Using
the latter, I combine information which I would not use when only crunching numbers with
information about the institutions within which the data were generated (e.g. information
about ownership, the rating process, and potential conflicts of interest), as well as with an
understanding of the incentive structures underlying the decisions of key actors. Third, my
identification strategy exploits a variety of sources off variation in the dependent variable.
Fourth, I try several specifications and include sovereign-fixed effects in my models. Including
sovereign-fixed effects would catch any factors potentially driving the political biases that
are not already driven by factors that are time-invariant in my sample. The prime example
of such factors in the context of this paper are the benefit that the US enjoys by having
the world’s reserve currency, and the possible monetary and fiscal restrictions that some
countries face by participating in monetary arrangements such as for example the European
currency snake/EMS (note that I already control for participation in an actual currency
union directly through a dummy variable, see Section 4).
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Main specification
To test for the existence of and mechanisms behind the argued political biases (home bias
and in-group bias), I estimate several models using OLS. My identification strategy exploits
three sources of variation in the dependent variable: 1) rating variation across sovereigns
at a given point in time, 2) rating variation across time for a given sovereign, 3) rating
variation across agencies for a given sovereign at a given point in time. Since ratings for
most countries are relatively stable across time, using only type 3) variation would not be
efficient for estimation purposes. Hence, in my main specification (3) I use all three types of
variation. Since both the US (Fitch, Moody’s, S&P) and Japan (JCR, R&I) host multiple
CRAs and I want to account for differences in the average rating level that exist between
agencies from one country, I use agency-fixed effects instead of broader home-country fixed
effects.18 Specifically, I model the rating r assigned to country i by agency a based in country
j at time t as
ra,j,i,t = β · xj,i,t + γ · ei,t + δ · pi,t + αa,j + τt + ǫa,j,i,t (3)
where xj,i,t represent the six country-dyad-specific controls, ei,t and pi,t represent the
fourteen country-specific economic and political factors, respectively; αa,j and τt are agency-
and period-fixed effects, respectively; and ǫa,j,i,t is the error term.
Alternative specifications
To reduce concerns about unobserved and time-invariant characteristics of rated sovereigns
as well as of agencies, I plan to run two augmented versions of my main specification (3).
First, I include sovereign-fixed effects ρi. Therefore, this specification no longer uses variation
of type 1) to identify the existence and mechanisms behind political biases but only variation
18Ratings are ordinal measures of the risk of default. Hence, an AA by one agency does not necessarily
correspond to an AA by another agency, justifying agency-fixed effects
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of type 2) and 3)
ra,j,i,t = β · xj,i + γ · ei,t + δ · pi,t + αa,j + τt + ρi + ǫa,j,i,t (4)
Second, I include sovereign-time-fixed effects θi,t, which implies identification of the polit-
ical biases based solely on variation in ratings across agencies for a given country-time-
observations, i.e. type 3) variation
ra,j,i,t = β · xj,i + γ · ei,t + δ · pi,t + αa,j + θi,t + ǫa,j,i,t (5)
Planned robustness checks
To corroborate my findings, I plan to perform a number of robustness checks once I have all
data available for evaluation. For example:
• Running regressions with different choices for the time period; Pre-GFC and post-GFC
samples. If my theory is right, we should see more pronounced political biases after
governments took over major financial institutions in the wake of the GFC.
• Running the main regressions with an ordered-probit model; Note that the dependent
variable used in the OLS regressions is treated as cardinal. That is, the difference
between a “AAA” and the subjacent “AA+” (a one-notch drop from the highest grade)
is the same as between a “BBB-” and the subjacent “BB+” (a one-notch drop below the
threshold to speculative grade). In settings with more than 7 values of the dependent
variable, the choice between OLS and probit should have little effect on the significance
and sign of the coefficients. Nevertheless, I will also run the main specification using
an ordered-probit model.
• Running agency-specific regressions; By pooling all agencies in one regression, I make
the assumption that each agency weighs all sovereign-specific factors the same way.
Since this may not necessarily be the case, running agency-specific regressions allows
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for differential weights and assessments across agencies.
6 Conclusion
The present paper addresses a debate in the literature on credit rating agencies and specifi-
cally sovereign credit ratings. The paper argues that there are two types of political biases
in sovereign ratings: a home bias and an in-group bias. The home bias leads rating agencies
to assign favorable ratings to their home country which are not justified based on economic
and political factors of the home country. The in-group bias leads rating agencies to assign
favorable ratings to geo-political partners, holding all else constant. The paper first discusses
why previous scholarship may not have found evidence of the in-group bias and hypothesizes
why such effects should become visible in the data when controlling for hidden debt owed
to China and when controlling for the global network of central bank swap lines. Next,
the paper discusses all potentially confounding variables and channels that could render
the hypothesized biases endogenous. Lastly, the paper suggests an identification strategy
and econometric specifications which take potential endogeneity issues into account. Due
to COVID-19 library closures, data access is severely limited and the empirical analysis is




Table 5: Rating scales
My scale CI Dagong DBRS Scope Fitch Moody’s JCR R&I S&P
21 AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA Aaa AAA AAA AAA
20 AA+ AA+ AAH AA+ AA+ Aa1 AA+ AA+ AA+
19 AA AA AA AA AA Aa2 AA AA AA
18 AA- AA- AAL AA- AA- Aa3 AA- AA- AA-
17 A+ A+ AH A+ A+ A1 A+ A+ A+
16 A A A A A A2 A A A
15 A- A- AL A- A- A3 A- A- A-
14 BBB+ BBB+ BBBH BBB+ BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ BBB+ BBB+
13 BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB Baa2 BBB BBB BBB
12 BBB- BBB- BBBL BBB- BBB- Baa3 BBB- BBB- BBB-
Investment Grade
Non-investment/Speculative Grade
11 BB+ BB+ BBH BB+ BB+ Ba1 BB+ BB+ BB+
10 BB BB BB BB BB Ba2 BB BB BB
9 BB- BB- BBL BB- BB- Ba3 BB- BB- BB-
8 B+ B+ BH B+ B+ B1 B+ B+ B+
7 B B B B B B2 B B B
6 B- B- BL B- B- B3 B- B- B-
5 CCC+ CCC+ CCCH CCC+ CCC+ Caa1 CCC+ CCC+ CCC+
4 CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC Caa2 CCC CCC CCC
3 CCC- CCC- CCCL CCC- CCC- Caa3 CCC- CCC- CCC-
2 CC CC CC CC CC Ca CC CC CC
1 C C C C C C C C C
1 DDD DDD DDD SD
1 DD DD DD
1 D D D D D D D D
1 RD RD
Note: The data on the rating scales is from the agencies’ websites.
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Table 6: Detailed ownership structure of CRAs
Agency HQ Ownership (as of December 2019) Ownership history
CI Limassol,
Cyprus
The shares of CI are held by three individu-
als: Afaf Adham, Amin Diab, Zafer Diab and
by one Kuwait company: Gulf Injifa Company
for General Trading and Contracting. There
are no entities rated by CI with an ownership
interest in the Company and no rated entity
is represented on the administrative board of
Gulf Injifa.
No publicly known changes
Dagong Beijing,
China
As of April 18 2019, Dagong Global Credit
Rating Co., Ltd has been strategically re-
structured by China Reform Holdings Co.,Ltd
(CRHC), a State-Owned -Enterprises ap-
proved by Chinese State Council.
Privately owned since its founding; Guan




As of 2019 100 privately owned by the Ameri-
can company Morningstar purchased DBRS




100% privately owed by Scope ratings. The
previous agency was called FERI EuroRating
Services AG. It was bought by Scope ratings
1. August 2016 for an undisclosed amount.
100% owned by MLP AG (publicly-traded
German company) since 2011; major share-
holders of MLP are Manfred Lautenschlaeger
(23.38%), Harris Associates (9.82%), Swiss
Life (9.9%), HDI Talanx AG (9.89%), Allianz
SE (6.27%).30% owned by Harald Quandt
Holding GmbH and 70% owned by Feri part-
ners until 2006; MLP AG acquired Before that
B56.6% including the 30% stake of the Quandt





100% owned by Hearst group. Part of Fitch Group (100% owned by FI-
MALAC) until 2006; 20% were sold to the
Hearst Corporation in 2006, additional 20% in




Stock company, largest shareholders: Jiji
Press, Ltd. (19.71%), JCR employees’ stock
ownership associations (6.51%), K.K. Kyodo
News (5.93%), Sumitomo Life Insurance Com-





Publicly traded since 2000; institutional own-
ership: 95.34%; top 5 institutional sharehold-
ers: Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (13.4%), Cap-
ital World Investors (8.1%), Vanguard Group
Inc. (6.2%), Bank of New York Mellon Corp
(4%), Massachusetts Financial Services Co.
(3.8%); further shareholders: BlackRock, Mor-
gan Stanley, State Street, Northern Trust
Corp., T. Rowe Price Associates




Stock company and part of Nikkei Group;
largest shareholders: Nikkei, Inc. (42.72%),
Nikkei Business Publications, Inc. (13.41%),
Quick Corp. (8.24%), The Bank of Tokyo-
Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd. (4.91%), Sumitomo Mit-
sui Banking Corp. (4.60%)
Established through the merger between




100% owned by McGraw Hill Companies, Inc.,
since 1966; major shareholders of the publicly-
traded McGraw Hill Companies: Capital
World Investors, Vanguard Group, State
Street Corp., Oppenheimer Funds Inc., Mor-
gan Stanley, Inc.; further shareholders: Black-
Rock, Bank of New York Mellon Corp., North-
ern Trust Corp., T. Rowe Price Associates
In 1941, merger of Poor’s Publishing (founded
1860) and Standard Statistics (founded in
1906)
Note: All information is from the companies’ websites, annual reports, or documents for shareholder communication.
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Table 7: Comparison of control variables used in major studies on credit ratings.
Authors Variables used
Cantor et al. per capita income, GDP growth, inflation, fiscal balance, external balance,
external debt, industrialization-dummy, past-default-dummy
Ferri et al. per capita income, real GDP growth, inflation, fiscal balance, exter-
nal balance, external debt, industrialization-dummy, (CAB+short-term
debt)/foreign exchange reserves
Archer et al. various democracy variables, trade, inflation, CAB, past-default-dummy,























Figure 2: Schematic illustraction of the rating process
32
References
Afonso, A. (2003). Understanding the determinants of sovereign debt ratings: Evidence for
the two leading agencies. Journal of Economics and Finance, 27(1):56–74.
Afonso, A., Furceri, D., and Gomes, P. (2012). Sovereign credit ratings and financial markets
linkages: application to european data. Journal of International Money and Finance,
31(3):606–638.
Aizenman, J. and Pasricha, G. K. (2010). Selective swap arrangements and the global finan-
cial crisis: Analysis and interpretation. International Review of Economics & Finance,
19(3):353–365.
Ammer, J. and Packer, F. (2000). How consistent are credit ratings? a geographic and
sectoral analysis of default risk. The Journal of Fixed Income, 10(3):24–30.
Archer, C. C., Biglaiser, G., and DeRouen, K. (2007). Sovereign bonds and the “democratic
advantage”: Does regime type affect credit rating agency ratings in the developing world?
International organization, 61(2):341–365.
Baker, C. (2013). The federal reserve’s use of international swap lines. Ariz. L. rev., 55:603.
Bar-Isaac, H. and Shapiro, J. (2011). Credit ratings accuracy and analyst incentives. Amer-
ican Economic Review, 101(3):120–24.
Barro, R. J. and Lee, J.-W. (2005). Imf programs: Who is chosen and what are the effects?
Journal of monetary Economics, 52(7):1245–1269.
Becker, G. S. (2010). The economics of discrimination. University of Chicago press.
Borensztein, E., Cowan, K., and Valenzuela, P. (2013). Sovereign ceilings “lite”? the impact
of sovereign ratings on corporate ratings. Journal of Banking & Finance, 37(11):4014–
4024.
Cantor, R., Packer, F., et al. (1994). The credit rating industry. Quarterly Review, pages
1–26.
Chey, H.-k. (2013). The fed swap lines and the global lender of last resort: The politics of
international monetary relations. In APSA 2013 Annual Meeting Paper.
Cole, H. L. and Kehoe, P. J. (1998). Models of sovereign debt: Partial versus general
reputations. International Economic Review, pages 55–70.
Dale, R. S. and Thomas, S. H. (1991). The regulatory use of credit ratings in international
financial markets. Journal of International Securities Markets, 5(3):9–18.
DiGiuseppe, M. R., Barry, C. M., and Frank, R. W. (2012). Good for the money: Inter-
national finance, state capacity, and internal armed conflict. Journal of Peace Research,
49(3):391–405.
Dreher, A. and Gassebner, M. (2008). Does political proximity to the us cause terror?
33
Economics Letters, 99(1):27–29.
Durbin, E. and Ng, D. (2005). The sovereign ceiling and emerging market corporate bond
spreads. Journal of international Money and Finance, 24(4):631–649.
Feldstein, M. and Horioka, C. (1979). Domestic savings and international capital flows.
Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Ferri, G., Liu, L.-G., and Stiglitz, J. E. (1999). The procyclical role of rating agencies:
Evidence from the east asian crisis. Economic Notes, 28(3):335–355.
Fitch Ratings, F. (2018). Fitch Ratings–Rating Definitions. Retrieved
from https://www.fitchratings.com/site/dam/jcr:6b03c4cd-611d-47ec-b8f1-
183c01b51b08/Rating
French, K. R. and Poterba, J. M. (1991). Investor diversification and international equity
markets. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Fuchs, A. and Gehring, K. (2017). The home bias in sovereign ratings. Journal of the
European Economic Association, 15(6):1386–1423.
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